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Standard of Care. The standard of care by which an actor is to be judged has
never been regarded as a completely objective one. Certain subjective charac-
teristics of an actor may be taken into account, including physical handicaps
and the mental and moral limitations of the young. In dealing with the young
all courts have recognized that there are two stages in a child's development as
regards his responsibility for negligence. In the initial stage he is not regarded
as being accountable for failing to perceive and guard against danger; in the
second stage he is accountable, but the standard of care is one that is specially
articulated for the young, and is usually expressed as the care of the reasonable
person of like age, intelligence, and experience.' Following this second stage
the child becomes accountable without respect to his age. Virtually all courts
have imposed an adult standard of care prior to the age of twenty-one, the age
of accountability for the making of contract.' In Texas the age of accountability
as an adult has been placed at fourteen, and for this reason it was held that the
same negligence per se standard applicable to adults should be applicable when
a sixteen-year-old girl entrusted her father's car to a youthful companion who
did not have a driver's license! The court observed that if there had been evi-
dence showing mental deficiency or lack of discretion uncommon to children of
her age, such evidence would have resulted in the continued application of a
youthful standard. Since mental handicaps of adults are not generally consider-
ed, this would not seem to be sound, especially as regards the issue of negligence
for the determination of liability, as distinguished from the issue of contributory
negligence that bars recovery.' Moreover, it is suggested that those who under-
take to engage in an adult activity, such as driving cars, should have imposed
upon them an objective standard of conduct without respect to any subjective
attribute-physical, mental, or otherwise. All drivers, the young, the lame,
the blind, and the inexperienced, should be required to operate automobiles in
a manner that others on the highway are entitled to expect.
Regarding the very young, the Supreme Court of Texas in Yarborough v.
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University. Dean, University of Texas
School of Law.
IRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965).
'See generally Schulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L.J.
618 (1927); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 917 (1961); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 570 (1959); Annot.,
174 A.L.R. 1080 (1948); Annot., 107 A.L.R. 4 (1937).
'Barnes v. Zinda, 464 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
4 In the revised edition of the Restatement of Torts the American Law Institute ap-
proved a caveat to the following effect: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether
insane persons are not required to conform for their own protection to the standard of con-
duct which society demands of sane persons." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 507
(1965). See also Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 392 (1932).
' Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961).
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Berner' held that as a matter of law a child between four and five could not be
found contributorily negligent. The court recognized that the common-law
age of accountability of seven had been modified in Texas, but the opinion did
for the first time clearly set forth an age for Texas below which a child is not
accountable, either for negligence or contributory negligence purposes. The
damaging event occurred at the Galveston beach when the plaintiff darted out
in front of the defendant's car, which was being driven between the waterline
and the plaintiff's parents' car about 100 feet from the waterline. In fixing an
age below which a child cannot be negligent and above which he must be ac-
countable as an adult, the courts must act somewhat arbitrarily, but the lines
seem now to be reasonably drawn in Texas.
Inferential Rebuttals. While Yarborough is a significant decision because of
the holding about the negligence of the young, it is far more important because
of the holding eliminating the practice of separate submission of inferential re-
buttal issues on unavoidable accident and sudden emergency. When there is
evidence at the trial to indicate that some nonhuman agency, such as fog, snow,
sleet, or the like, so contributed to the accident as to prevent it from being re-
garded as proximately caused by the negligence of anyone involved in the event,
the trial judge has been required on request to submit the issue of unavoidable
accident as a defensive theory7 The court noted that when one of the parties
to the event is incapable of negligence, such as a very young child, then the
conduct of such a person can also raise the defensive theory.! The court held
however that the concepts of unavoidable accident and sudden emergency
should not hereafter be submitted as separate issues. The only real purpose for
such issues is to direct the jury's attention to factual theories rebutting either
negligence or proximate cause, and this purpose, the court said, would "be
better served by explanatory charges or definitions."' The court went on to say:
"We accordingly hold the better practice dictates that, upon retrial of this case,
if the evidence presents these theories, the defendant Berner will be entitled to
suitable explanatory charges or definitions which fairly present to the jury the
fact that unavoidable accident or sudden emergency may be present." 0
There is no difficulty about how to provide explanatory instructions related
to sudden emergency. It would logically be done in connection with the defi-
nition of negligence because the existence or non-existence of an emergency at
the time an actor was allegedly negligent tends to rebut the argument that he
was negligent, even though the course of action taken was a mistake of judg-
ment. However, there are some problems related to what to say in the explana-
tory instructions because of some uncertainties in the substantive law. In the
first place, it is usually said that the actor whose judgment is being questioned
6467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971).
1 G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 19 (1959). The issue as it has
been submitted is as follows: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
occurrence in question was not the result of an unavoidable accident? 'Unavoidable accident'
means an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it." 1 STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 3.03 (1969).
8 467 S.W.2d at 191.
9 Id. at 192.
" 1d. at 193.
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must not himself have been at fault in bringing about the emergency. This is
seemingly unsound. Of course, negligent conduct in bringing about an emer-
gency would generally be a proximate cause of a damaging event that was a
consequence of action taken in response to the emergency. But it is logically
immaterial to the issue of how an actor should be expected to respond in the
emergency, and this can be of vital importance on the issue of discovered peril.
In the second place, it may be that in Texas a litigant who is responsible for an
emergency and thereby terrorizes the other litigant cannot successfully argue
that the latter responded negligently in his terrorized condition. This distinction
between "sudden emergency" and "imminent peril" was discussed in a decision
made at the close of the year."
There would appear to be several differences between the two doctrines.
When "imminent peril" applies, the litigant who is placed in such peril is not
legally accountable. He is no longer held to a standard of ordinary care. How-
ever, the doctrine applies only when the perilous plight of the litigant was cre-
ated by the negligence of the other litigant, so that if the "peril" or "emergen-
cy" was of innocent origin or was caused by a third person, then only "sudden
emergency" is applicable." The logic in this would seem to be that a litigant
who is responsible for another being placed in peril should not be heard to
argue that the other responded thereto improperly. The notion is that the great-
er fault lies with the litigant who creates the perilous situation. This imminent
peril doctrine may indeed be available only to the plaintiff, for the court said:
"A person is not legally accountable for imprudent conduct resulting in injury
to himself when such conduct results from a state of terror reasonably springing
from an imminent peril created by the negligent conduct of the defendant."1
So limited, the doctrine, like discovered peril, is one that is designed to obviate
the rigors of the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery.
Finally, in "imminent peril" it appears that a jury must find that the plain-
tiff was terrorized by the defendant's conduct. 4 If this is an effort to distinguish
between fear that is necessarily engendered when a sudden emergency arises
requiring immediate action and terror, then this is an impractical, hair-splitting
distinction. There is some justification for relieving a litigant of the burden of
responding as an ordinary person would do when an emergency is produced
by the other litigant, but there would seem to be no justification for trying to
distinguish between terror and fear.
As to unavoidable accident, it is generally said that this rebuts either the
existence of negligence on the part of anyone involved in the event, or the fact
that any such negligence was the proximate cause of the damaging event.
Therefore, it cuts across the usual definitions of both negligence and proximate
cause. Moreover, unless abstractly given, it might be considered to be a charge
on the weight of the evidence, and unless the explanatory instruction on "un-
avoidable accident" actually directs attention to some specific factual theory
"1Del Bosque v. Heitmann Bering-Cortes Co., 474 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1971).
12 Goolsbee v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 150 Tex. 528, 243 S.W.2d 386 (1951); International
& G.N.R.R. v. Neff, 87 Tex. 303, 28 S.W. 283 (1894). See also Thode, Imminent Perit
and Emergency in Texas, 40 TEXAs L. REV. 441 (1962).
13474 S.W.2d at 453 (emphasis added).
4 See Thode, supra note 12.
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(such as fog) to explain an accident, it is rather confusing to give it. In addi-
tion, defining unavoidable accident without using the term "unavoidable acci-
dent" in issues that are submitted to the jury is a questionable practice. It would
be better practice to omit any instruction on unavoidable accident. The trial
attorneys are free to argue that a damaging event was unavoidable for reasons
other than that it was brought about by some nonhuman agency.
Discovered Peril. The discovered peril doctrine is tolerable only because con-
tributory negligence should not be a complete bar to recovery. This is not to
say that a comparative negligence statute is the only alternative. When two or
more negligent actors proximately cause injury to one of themselves, each could
be required to contribute in proportion to the number of persons responsible
for the injury. This is in effect the rule when joint tortfeasors are responsible
for injuring a nonnegligent person. Until, however, something is done about
the long-established rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to re-
covery, a properly applied discovered peril doctrine that would permit the
plaintiff to recover all of his damages, notwithstanding his contributory negli-
gence, may be justified. At least it is commonly applied in one form or another.
In Texas the rule has been for some time that the defendant must not only dis-
cover the plaintiff in a position of peril, but he must also realize that the plain-
tiff cannot or will probably not extricate himself." This requires a finding of a
subjective state of mind similar to that required under the "no-duty," open-and-
obvious-danger rule applicable to those encountering dangerous conditions and
activities on land."
It is feasible and practical to distinguish between an instance in which the
defendant did not see the plaintiff because he was not keeping a proper look-
out from a situation in which the defendant did see the plaintiff who was either
helpless or oblivious to his peril. It is, however, much more questionable to
distinguish between an instance in which the defendant did see but did not
realize the plaintiff's peril (although he should have) from an instance in
which the defendant did see and did realize the plaintiff's peril. If such a dis-
tinction is made, however, as it is in Texas, it would seem that the knowledge
of facts which would cause a reasonable man to realize the plaintiff's peril
would be a sufficient basis for a jury finding that the defendant realized the
peril-regardless of what the defendant's testimony might be as to his state of
mind. Therefore, evidence of the situation shortly before the damaging event
that would have caused a reasonable man to realize that the plaintiff was in
peril would be sufficient to justify a jury finding that the defendant did actually
realize that peril. This, however, was not the result reached by the supreme
court in two cases arising out of a collision at a railroad crossing.' Two men,
the driver and a passenger, were killed in an automobile that collided with a
train. Two separate suits were filed, one for the death of the driver and the
1 Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Hart, 163 Tex. 450, 356 S.W.2d 901 (1962); Ford v. Panhandle
& S.F. Ry., 151 Tex. 538, 252 S.W.2d 561 (1952).
"0Rabb v. Coleman, 469 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1971). This case is commented upon at text
accompanying notes 29-35 infra.
'7 Stanley v. Southern Pac. Co., 466 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1971); Gentry v. Southern Pac.
Co., 457 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1970).
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other for the passenger. The cases were tried together, but separately appealed.
The railroad crossing was protected by signs on the highway some distance
from the crossing and by flashing lights operating at the crossing. The highway
was practically perpendicular to the railroad tracks. The fireman of the train
discovered the automobile when it was 2,000 or more feet from the crossing,
and so all the evidence indicated awareness of the facts from that time on in
regard to the issue of whether the driver of the car was not likely to stop. Since
the passenger was not found to have been contributorily negligent, the only
issue in the action for his wrongful death was whether the fireman or the engi-
neer could be found to have been negligent, and this could be found if the
fireman or engineer failed to take precautions after the fireman should have
realized the plaintiff's peril. With one judge dissenting, the court held that the
evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligence."' In the companion
case, however, involving the action for the wrongful death of the driver, the
court said the evidence was insufficient to justify a finding of the jury that the
fireman discovered and realized the peril of plaintiff at a time when the acci-
dent could have been avoided. 9 In fact, it was said: "We hold, as a matter of
law, the plaintiff was not in a position of peril at that time.""0 If that sentence
is accurate, then it would seem to follow that there could be no negligence be-
cause no one could be charged with negligence in failing to realize peril, if
there was no peril.
II. IMMUNITIES
The assault on immunities--charitable, governmental, and family-has
been proceeding apace for some years throughout the country. In general an
immunity is a rule of nonliability based upon the notion that whereas plaintiff
is deserving of recovery and would be able to do so under like circumstances
against most persons and legal entities, there is an overriding social interest
to be served in insulating a particular entity or person from most if not all
types of tort actions.
Charitable Immunity. In a five-to-four decision, Watkins v. Southcrest Bap-
tist Church,"' the Supreme Court of Texas warned that the doctrine of char-
itable immunity might be overruled the next time the matter was presented
to it. This immunity, which was initially based largely on the fear that tort
liability might impair the rendition of services currently needed and being
performed by institutions and entities that were not organized for profit, has
already been abrogated by most jurisdictions throughout the country by judi-
cial decision.2 The decision by the court in Howle v. Camp Amon Carter"
"8Stanley v. Southern Pac. Co., 466 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1971).
1" Gentry v. Southern Pac. Co., 457 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1970).
" ld. at 893.
21 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966).
22 In 1969 the Supreme Judidal Court of Massachusetts observed that "in the past on
many occasions we have declined to renounce the defense of charitable immunity .... "
It was further observed that this abstention was based on the opinion that any renunciation
should preferably be accomplished by the legislature. Now it appears that only three or four
states adhere to the doctrine. Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Mass. 1969).
"470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971).
19721 TORTS
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
was not, therefore, any surprise either to the bench or to the bar. Unlike the
complete immunity which the state and other political subdivisions enjoyed,
a charitable institution's immunity was always qualified. It has been held
liable for managerial negligence." Now it is subject to vicarious liability under
the same rules of respondeat superior applicable to corporations and other
entities organized for profit. The plaintiff's injury occurred at a boys camp
operated by the Y.M.C.A. of Fort Worth. Plaintiff alleged that his injuries
were proximately caused by the negligence of camp employees in failing to
supervise one of plaintiff's fellow campers in the casting of a fishing line.
Plaintiff was struck in the eye by a sinker or hook attached to the fishing line.
The trial court had granted summary judgment for the defendant, and this
action was affirmed by the court of civil appeals. The case was remanded for
trial by the supreme court. There was a dissenting opinion based largely on
the idea that the legislature, having seen fit to enact legislation in the immun-
ity area by waiving sovereign immunity only to a limited extent, should be
left with the task of deciding what to do about the charitable immunity doc-
trine. Certain inconsistencies were noted about the consequences of the com-
plete abrogation of charitable immunity and partial abrogation of govern-
mental immunity. As the dissenting justice observed: "The sum of these in-
consistencies is that the charitable institution, which performs no less a public
service than its governmental counterpart, now faces unlimited exposure to
a judgment of catastrophic proportions, while a public school or college re-
mains rather well protected by legislation."'
On the other hand, there are now numerous inconsistencies between the tort
liability of private enterprise performing services similar to those of charitable
enterprise, including the socially desirable services rendered by a boys camp.
Moreover, in view of the nature of the legislative process, inaction does not
necessarily mean that the legislature was opposed to complete abrogation in
this area. Broadly speaking, it would seem that charitable enterprise should be
treated more like private enterprise than governmental enterprise, if indeed gov-
ernmental enterprise is to be treated differently from private enterprise. It may
be that the proper and appropriate imposition of tort liability on the taxpayer
because of allegedly improper action on the part of those engaged in the ren-
dition of uniquely governmental functions is a problem of much greater com-
plexity than that presented when the limited resources and less complicated
actions of those rendering charitable services are involved. It is good, however,
to be aware of the inconsistencies so that legislative reform of the Texas Tort
Claims Acte' can be furthered.
Parental Immunity. Until recently in most jurisdictions a parent was immune
from tort liability to a minor child for personal harm." There were other family
immunities, including the immunity of one spouse from tort liability to the
24 Sullivan v. Sisters of St. Francis, 374 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1963).
25470 S.W.2d at 631 (Pope, J., dissenting).
26TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970).




other spouse for personal harm and the immunity of a minor child from tort
liability to the parent. The underlying policy reason for all family immunities
was that of preservation of domestic harmony, the notion being that lawsuits
would be a disruptive influence. Perhaps a sounder reason for parental immuni-
ty is the likelihood that in those cases in which the damaging event is of the
unintentional variety the parent would be able to make a better judgment about
how best to utilize the family assets that are available to the welfare of the
members of the family than can a court. This is also the writer's view.
In Felderhoff v. Felderhof§' the supreme court handed down a decision of
significance that alters materially the immunity of the parent from tort liabili-
ty to a minor child. It may also have an impact on the other family immunities.
Plaintiff was a fourteen-year-old child who was allegedly injured as a proximate
result of the negligence of his father. It was alleged that the father was at the
time engaged in the furtherance of a partnership enterprise, and that his son
was an employee of the partnership. The partnership was engaged in a farming
and ranching enterprise. On the occasion of the damaging event the plaintiff
and his father had completed combining a field of milo and were cleaning up
the combine. Through the alleged negligence of the father the plaintiff's arm
was seriously injured. Suit was brought against the copartners, and the court
assumed for the purposes of the opinion that the father would be jointly and
severally liable for any debts of the partnership. Reversing and remanding the
case, the court held that the partners, including the parent, would be personally
liable in this situation. It was urged by the plaintiff that the general rule of
parental immunity should be abrogated as some courts have done, but the court
cited with approval decisions in Kentucky, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, which
retained the immunity rule with respect to alleged acts of ordinary negligence
involving "a reasonable exercise of parental authority or the exercise of ordi-
nary parental discretion with respect to provisions for the care and necessities
of the child,"' the fear being that tort liability in those areas could be disrup-
tive of the "wide sphere of reasonable discretion which is necessary" and appro-
priate." It would seem rather clear that the assets of a business enterprise-
partnership, corporate, or otherwise--ought to be available for compensating
other victims. But the court goes much further. All assets of the parent are
available to compensate for injuries proximately resulting from negligence
occurring in the course of business activities. Moreover, it is apparent that in-
juries may often occur when the negligent act was one that was neither related
to business activities nor to the exercise of parental duties and responsibilities.
It is likely that the immunity will be abrogated in this area as well as in the
business area and that an immunity will be limited to the parental responsibili-
ty area. As with most distinctions, line-drawing will no doubt be difficult in
particular situations. It should be said also that the court's holding was not
based on the prevalence or presence of liability insurance. Since the presence
of liability insurance that does not exclude coverage to members of the family
eliminates all of the old reasons for parental immunity, the immunity to that
28473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971).
291 Id. at 933.




extent arguably ought to be regarded as waived, notwithstanding, as in the
automobile guest situation, the fact that there is the likelihood of collusion.
III. OCCUPIERS OF LAND
Open and Obvious Dangers. Rabb v. Coleman3' is another in a long line of
cases 2 to further illustrate both the theoretical and the practical difficulties of
recognizing a general principle that one who voluntarily encounters a known
and appreciated risk should not be entitled to recover for harm thereafter re-
sulting from such risk. Plaintiff's husband died as a result of burns sustained in
a flash explosion while his butane tank was being refilled. The tank was ap-
proximately ten feet from the back door of the deceased's home. While delivery
was being made, the deceased was standing nearby observing the operations.
During what had appeared to be routine procedure, the pop-off valve suddenly
opened and began releasing butane gas with a loud noise. It appears that this
valve was set to open when the pressure in the tank exceeded eighty pounds per
square inch.
The jury found that the employee of the defendant put a mixture in the bu-
tane gas containing a greater amount of propane gas than a person of ordinary
prudence would have done under the circumstances, and that such act was a
proximate cause of the explosion. The jury also found that the deceased was
not contributorily negligent. However, the jury further found in response to
issues on the defense of volenti non fit injuria that: ( 1 ) prior to the explosion
in question a perilous condition existed; (2) the deceased knew of the perilous
condition; (3) the deceased realized that he was in a dangerous position due
to such peril; and (4) the deceased voluntarily exposed himself to such dangers.
The plaintiff argued that: (1) the finding about appreciation of danger was
too general to serve as a bar to recovery; and (2) that the volenti defense was
not applicable because the deceased was on his own land, and thus was where
he chose to be as a matter of right, as distinguished from an invitee who goes
on another's land rightfully only because he has permission from the occupier-
defendant to do so.
The majority of the supreme court held against the plaintiff on both con-
tentions. My comments on this case must be considered in the light of a con-
viction that I have previously expressed that even an invitee on the land of
another should not be denied relief simply on the ground that a danger was
open and obvious.' But, if one who is victimized by an obviously dangerous
condition that he has encountered is to be denied relief in some situations, that
denial of relief should be limited to the situation in which he had no right or
privilege by law, independent of the defendant's willingness, to be present at
31469 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1971).
" For two important cases see Love Chem. Co. v. Greenwood, 433 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.
1968); Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963). This subject
has been discussed in prior Annual Surveys: Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
24 Sw. L.J. 3, 5 (1970); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 1, 10
(1969); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 4, 8 (1968). See also
Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108 (1961).
'Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108 (1961); Keeton,
Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 20 TEXAs L. REV. 562 (1942); Keeton, Personal
injury Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 631 (1952).
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the place where he was injured. 4 The "no-duty," open-and-obvious-danger rule
has been so limited, and to so limit that rule but adopt at the same time a gen-
eral defense with the only change being a change in the burden of proof and
pleading is without a rational justification. For a defendant to require the plain-
tiff to give up a clear right or privilege unless he chooses to encounter a negli-
gently created danger should always be regarded as a "coercive" willingness to
encounter the danger. It is always involuntary. Moreover to submit to a jury
the question of whether the plaintiff encountered a danger "voluntarily" with-
out defining the term is questionable. However, the holding of the court is to
the effect that the volenti defense is an affirmative defense to any negligence
action in which the defendant is responsible for a dangerous condition or activ-
ity of which the plaintiff knows, appreciates the danger, and voluntarily en-
counters. Even so, it is clear that one who knowingly encounters danger to res-
cue another imperiled by the defendant's negligence will not be denied relief."
Perhaps it will be said that this is involuntary. But what makes it involuntary?
The best reason is that the rescuer has a privilege by law without regard to
plaintiff's wishes in the matter, and he should be able to recover so long as he
acts reasonably to accomplish his objective. Those who burden the exercise of a
privilege by negligently endangering those who exercise it should be liable in
the absence of contributory negligence.
The majority also concluded that it was not necessary to have a more spe-
cific finding about appreciation of danger than that found, namely that the
plaintiff knew of the perilous condition and realized that he was in a dangerous
position. "To require further qualification of this peril would unreasonably
diminish the utility of the volenti doctrine as a workable defense.""5 I would
hope so. Four justices thought that the doctrine should require a showing and
a finding of full knowledge and appreciation of the very specific danger "so that
one against whom the doctrine is invoked may be said to have intelligently
chosen to put himself in the way of the risk.""7 In the dissenting opinion it was
pointed out that: ( 1 ) the deceased was unaware of the unsafe mixture; (2) the
deceased might not have known and appreciated that an explosion might occur
outside the tank; and (3) the deceased might have thought that the pop-off
valve was performing its function of eliminating-not creating a danger.8
While, if such a defense is to be recognized, it may be too much to require full
appreciation of the danger, it would seem that the magnitude and nature of
the danger ought to have been appreciated by the plaintiff to the extent it
either was appreciated by defendant, or should have been in the exercise of
ordinary care. 8 This could be the test given to the jury.
" In a leading article over 60 years ago Bohlen took this position. Bohlen, Voluntary As-
sumption of Risk, 20 HARv. L. REV. 14, 91 (1906), -reprinted in F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN
THE LAW OF TORTS 441 (1926).
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965).
3 469 S.W.2d at 388.
7 Id. (dissenting opinion).
38 Id.
8 Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122, 125
(1961): "The risk referred to in assumption of the risk is a risk that causes defendant's
conduct to be characterized as infringing a legal standard. Where the basis of liability is
negligence, that risk is determined from the point of view of the ordinarily prudent person
1972]
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Occupier's Duty to Employees of Independent Contractors. In 1967 the Su-
preme Court of Texas in Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry" adopted the princi-
ple that an adequate warning to an independent contractor discharges as a
matter of law the occupier's duty to employees of the independent contractor.
The court in that case recognized that an issue of fact might sometimes exist
as to the adequacy of the warning, but if the warning is such as to give full
notice to the independent contractor of the dangers involved, the sole respon-
sibility for preventing injuries thereafter is on the independent contractor whose
liability would be governed by the Texas workmen's compensation laws. In
commenting on Delhi, it was observed in 1968 that the court could have re-
garded the general contractor as having an unlimited duty of ordinary care and
could have left the question for the jury to decide whether ordinary care re-
quired greater precaution than simply giving adequate warning to the indepen-
dent contractor-subject only to the Halepeska limitation that the danger was
one that was open and obvious to the victimized employee."1 The principle of
Delhi was carried one step further by a majority of the court in Pence Construc-
tion Corp. v. Watson.' The defendant, Pence Construction Corporation, was
a general contractor and, therefore, in occupancy and control. It subcontracted
the roof decking work for a one-story commercial building to the Greer Com-
pany, the employer of the plaintiff. One crew of the subcontractor covered a
structural steel frame with galvanized metal sheets, but left some openings
where vents were to be. On the following day another crew of the subcontrac-
tor came to the job to pour a layer of concrete mixture on top of the metal
sheeting, and plaintiff was one of the members of this crew. He fell through
one of the openings. It was plaintiff's contention that the general contractor
should have barricaded or covered the opening. The trial court took the case
from the jury. The court of civil appeals concluded that the knowledge of the
employees of the subcontractor who installed the metal sheets was not the same
as knowledge of the subcontractor, and that the danger was not so open and
obvious as to charge the plaintiff with actual appreciation of it.' Therefore,
there was an issue of fact on whether the general contractor was negligent
either in failing to warn the subcontractor or reduce the danger. The supreme
court unanimously reversed and affirmed the trial court judgment. Two justices
justified this result on the established legal proposition that a dangerous condi-
tion can be so open and obvious that a person will be charged with knowledge
of the condition and appreciation of the danger as a matter of law." The major-
ity reasoned that a general contractor would not be required to tell one crew or
employee of a subcontractor what another crew or employee of that same con-
tractor has done in the performance of the work for which a subcontractor is
employed unless the danger was one that an employee would not recognize by
examination of his work site." This is a substantially broader proposition than
in the position of the defendant at some one or more times prior to the occurrence of the
harm."40416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967).
"' Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 4, 9 (1968).
42470 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1971).
41462 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston f1st Dist.] 1970).
"470 S.W.2d at 639 (concurring opinion).
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the one utilized by the concurring justices. Naturally, one who believes that
the general contractor should be regarded as having a general and unrestricted
duty of ordinary care would view his inaction in failing either to warn or re-
duce the magnitude of the danger as an issue of negligence, normally for the
jury to pass upon. The fact that the danger is one that an examination would
disclose is relevant on the issue, but in view of the evidence that such openings
were usually or sometimes closed is not necessarily conclusive.
IV. RELEASES AND JOINT TORTFEASORS
In 1932 the Texas Supreme Court held that the unqualified release of one
joint tortfeasor released the other, but the only justification offered was that for
one injury there should be only one satisfaction. The court, therefore, equated
the release of one tortfeasor with satisfaction."' Dissatisfaction with the vicious-
ness of the release rule resulted in the development of various expedients to
sidestep its effect. The most important has been the covenant not to sue, by
which the injured party simply agreed not to enforce his cause of action against
the tortfeasor with whom settlement was made.' From this development there
followed the practice of specifically reserving in the settlement agreement the
right to sue others, and the Texas courts regarded such an instrument as a cove-
nant not to sue." Thereafter parol evidence was allowed to show that the re-
leasor did not intend the settlement in full satisfaction, but merely as an agree-
ment not to sue the tortfeasor with whom settlement was made."
In McMillen v. Klingensmith" the supreme court adopted the rule that when
an injured party settles with a party to a damaging event, he releases only the
party or parties named in the document. As the court observes, this rule is fair-
er and easier and avoids the traps and complications of the older rule. Apparent-
ly, parol evidence will not be admissible to show that the injured party received
the amount agreed upon as full satisfaction for all damages. In McMillen the
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident, and her injuries were allegedly
thereafter aggravated by the negligent diagnosis and treatment of defendant
doctors, which resulted in permanent damage to her larynx. The plaintiff had
released the driver of the automobile, and then sued the physicians. Summary
judgment was entered in behalf of the doctors, and this action of the trial court
was affirmed in the court of civil appeals. In reversing and changing the law,
the court makes it clear that an injured party will not be entitled to recover
more than the amount for full satisfaction of his damages. The impact of the
release, effective only with respect to the named original tortfeasor, on the ex-
tent of the liability of the successive tortfeasor, not being before the court, was
not discussed. This is a rather complicated problem in the light of Palestine
"Elston v. City of Panhandle, 121 Tex. 553, 50 S.W.2d 1090 (1932).
474 A. CORWIN, CoNTRAcTs §§ 932-33 (1951); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 338A
(rev. ed. 1936).
"City of Coleman v. Kenley, 168 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943), error
ref. w.o.m.; Cox v. Rio Grande Valley Tel. Co., 13 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-
tonio 1929), error dismissed.
4 9 Eckel v. First Nat'l Bank, 165 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1943),
error ref.
50467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1971).
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Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins.5 Perhaps that case should be reconsidered with the
thought in mind that a defendant in a settlement negotiation is virtually always
represented by competent counsel, and can protect himself against further re-
sponsibility by way of a contribution action by a simple provision in the settle-
ment agreement requiring plaintiff to indemnify him if indeed he is called upon
for contribution.
V. PRIVATE NUISANCE
Much has been written on the subject of private nuisance that I consider to
be misleading and inaccurate. It has been said that liability for nuisance es-
caped the transition to fault principles which characterized most areas of tort
law, and that it has remained an isolated island of liability without fault. 2
Prosser, in commenting on Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.,"5 a leading decision of
the Supreme Court of Texas in which Rylands v. Fletcher" and all variations
thereof were rejected as a basis for the imposition of strict liability on an oil
company for damage resulting from the unintentional escape of salt water from
a disposal pit, recites numerous examples of activities conducted by an occupier
which were regarded as nuisances because of their location, and concludes
therefrom that American courts, including those of Texas, have imposed strict
liability under the guise of absolute nuisance." Prosser has also stated that there
is no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the
word "nuisance."" If that be so, the notion that the courts, especially in Texas,
have imposed strict liability in the guise of a nuisance has contributed to this
impenetrable jungle. When the defendant engages in an activity that annoys
and discomforts others in the vicinity of that activity, he is often held liable for
the consequential harm thereby inflicted, even though the activity is socially de-
sirable and even though utmost care is exercised. But the situation is virtually
always one in which he knew that the necessary effect of his activity was to
interfere with the use and enjoyment by another of his property. The interfer-
ence was not accidental as in Turner; it was intentional. The issue is how much
harm an enterpriser is justified in deliberately inflicting on another without
paying for it. Not even the government is allowed to take or damage property
intentionally without paying for it, and certainly the same should be true for
private enterprise. The fact that the activity is socially desirable does not mean
that the liability, if imposed, is without fault in the sense in which that term
ought to be used. When the defendant engages in an activity with knowledge
that this activity is interfering with the plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of his
property, and the interference is substantial and unreasonable in extent, the
defendant is liable, and the monetary recovery of the plaintiff is simply a cost
of engaging in the kind of activity in which the defendant was engaged. ' This
should be so regardless of whether the conduct is committed in the air, on water,
5'386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1965).
521 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS §§ 519-24 (1956).
"128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936), noted in 15 TEXAS L. REv. 355 (1937).
54 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
" Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REv. 399, 419-20 (1942).
5'W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971).
11 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
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on highways, or on private property. In Wales Trucking Co. v. Stallcup8 plain-
tiffs, homeowners adjoining an unpaved highway, brought suit against the de-
fendant trucking company for dust damage sustained by them as a result of the
defendant's activity in hauling eight loads of pipe on the highway during a
period of several months. In reversing the court of civil appeals, the supreme
court said: "We do not, however, regard the facts in this case before us as war-
ranting a holding of liability without fault, or nuisance without fault (there
being no unlawful, malicious, or negligent conduct) where the activity is of a
temporary nature and simply involves the lawful use of a public road to deliver
pipe for a public water supply project.'. My point is that if liability had been
imposed it would not be liability without fault. It was undisputed that the dust
from the operations was severe and like snow, and it is clear that the defendant
knew that his activities were having a harmful effect on the plaintiff. The ques-
tion is: How much of the value of the plaintiff's property shall the defendant
be allowed to appropriate without paying for it? The answer is: not much. If
the dust interfered substantially and unreasonably with the plaintiff, then the
plaintiff should recover. Whether the interference in a given situation was sub-
stantial and unreasonable is normally a question for the jury. The issues were
perhaps not quite correctly submitted, but perhaps well enough. The jury found
that substantial amounts of dust were deposited on plaintiff's property, and that
this was the result of the unreasonable and excessive use of the highway. I
would construe the findings to mean that the plaintiff was interfered with sub-
stantially and unreasonably. The interference is unreasonable when a reasonable
man would conclude that the activity should bear the burden of the harm that is
an inevitable by-product of the activity.
58474 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1971).
5' Id. at 189.
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